The Effects of Policy on Cuban Transnational Families by Flanagan, Zoë
Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs 
Volume 3 
Issue 1 Cuba Today Article 2 
December 2018 
The Effects of Policy on Cuban Transnational 
Families 
Zoë Flanagan 
Portland State University, zflanagan13@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/hgjpa 
 Part of the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Flanagan, Zoë (2018) "The Effects of Policy on Cuban Transnational Families," Hatfield Graduate Journal 
of Public Affairs: Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 2. 
https://doi.org/10.15760/hgjpa.2018.3.1.2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access. Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-SA: This article is distributed 
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
sa/4.0/). 
2018                   THE HATFIELD GRADUATE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS                 1 
 
 








This paper examines the effects of nations’ policies on transnational 
families, specifically looking at Cuban families. Transnationalism is a 
relatively young theory, it was developed in the mid-1990s as an alternative 
to the migration theories of assimilation and integration. Scholars argued 
at the time that migrants were actively maintaining ties with their homeland 
while also establishing themselves in their respective receiving nations. The 
transnational practices of families are greatly impacted by the policies of 
both the home nation and the receiving nation, making Cuba a unique case 
to examine given the governments’ extreme control over migration since the 
revolution in 1959. This paper looks at the theory of transnationalism and 
what role the state has played in the internal dynamics of family units as 
well as in the creation of transnational families altogether. The researcher 
specifically asks how the perception of Cuban transnational families has 
changed over time, primarily looking at the period of 1959 – 2000, with 
some reflection on modern day. This research is the result of an in-depth 
review of the literature, as well as a two-week study tour to Cuba.   
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
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s policy professionals, we must consider the implications of the policies 
we design. These policies will eventually be implemented and will affect 
fellow citizens, in the most extreme cases this will be a matter of life or death. 
This is the advice and warning Dr. Philip Cooper provides to incoming 
Masters in Public Policy students at Portland State University. Moving this 
question a step forward, this paper asks what is the role of a policy 
professional who will develop policy that affects transnational families? This 
would be families with ties to a foreign nation, and therefore foreign citizens. 
When the unit of the family is itself divided across a border, the policies which 
are intended to support the US resident may in fact harm them. The lives of 
transnational Cuban families provide an interesting example of this policy 
dilemma. According to the United Nations Trends in International Migrant 
Stock, 1.5 million Cubans live outside of its borders as of 2017; with eighty 
percent of the diaspora residing in the United States,1 US policymakers 
directly affect these transnational families on many levels. 
 
This research will first seek to better understand the theory of 
transnationalism. It will then examine the case of Cuba and how policy played 
a role in creating transnational families historically. We ask how has the 
perception of Cuban transnational families changed over time? The primary 
focus of the research presented here is on the formative period between 1959 
and 2000. While the Cuban diaspora is spread throughout the world, this paper 
primarily focuses on the diaspora in the US, and the US and Cuban policies 
affecting Cubans on the island as well as Cuban émigrés. The research will 
show the diversity of transnational families, as well as how these families 
respond to the various policies enacted by their governments. It will also show 
the role these policies played in acting as push and pull factors for the Cuban 
émigrés. 
 
The research presented here is the result of an in-depth review of the 
literature in combination with a two week visit to Cuba as part of a graduate 
course. The two weeks in Cuba provided the researcher with context and 
information on which direction to focus her research. The paper ends with 
some observations and general themes gathered while in Cuba.    
 
 
The Roots of Transnationalism 
 
 The theory of transnationalism was developed in the mid-1990s as an 
alternative to the migrant theories of integration and assimilation. It was 
during this time that researchers in migration studies were becoming aware of 
the phenomenon of migrants maintaining ties to their homeland in varied 
aspects of their lives. They defined transnationalism,  
A 
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as the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-
stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and 
settlement. We call these processes transnationalism to emphasize that 
many immigrants today build social fields that cross geographic, cultural, 
and political borders. Immigrants who develop and maintain multiple 
relationships - familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and 
political -  that span borders we call 'transmigrants'.2 
 
Prior to this definition migrants were categorized dichotomously, in 
which identity and the way of life became an all or nothing decision or 
experience.3 Policies of forced assimilation, such as English only instruction 
in schools,4 sent the message that migrants were expected to exchange the 
parts of their identity that were foreign in order to become American. 
However, the reality on the ground showed migrants maintaining strong ties 
to their homeland while concurrently building ties to the host nation. These 
ties to the homeland are both tangible and intangible, whether through visits 
home or by sending funds to family, or by maintaining religious practices 
rooted in the culture of the homeland. Researchers found that migrants lived 
a life where national borders often blurred. Furthermore, as communication 
technology has increased, so has the ability for migrants to hold onto these 
ties and even strengthen them.  
 
In recent years, the transnational literature has committed a lot of attention 
to the study of transnational parenting and the effects on the children left 
behind by transmigrant parents. Zentgraf and Chinchilla examined the 
challenging cost-benefit analysis parents go through in making their decision 
to migrate, often in the name of supporting those children they must leave 
behind.5 This literature brings to bare important concepts and observations, 
such as the varying definitions of family and the gender disparity in 
transmigrant parenting behaviors as well as perceived responsibilities. A 
western definition of the nuclear family can lead to a lack of understanding of 
transnational families and how they function. In some cultures, family is not 
so narrowly defined, and it is quite possible to have the role of the parent not 
played solely by the mother or father. Therefore, the choice to leave one’s 
child in order to provide more financial support may not necessarily equate to 
leaving a child without a supportive and nurturing network.6 Additionally, 
research shows while both mothers and fathers may send remittances, mothers 
are more likely to put additional work into maintaining emotional support in 
addition to financial support. This disparity in behavior is reflected in 
children’s expectations of contact “whereby mothers are expected to continue 
to try to maintain emotional intimacy more than father.”7 
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It is important that we pay attention to the policy implications of 
transnational parenting as well. Notably, in the 2012 study from Zentgraf et 
al., the authors write that “public policies in sending and receiving countries 
shape transnational parenting practices and the costs and benefits of parent 
child separations in important but often invisible ways.”8 For example, 
policies in the host country will determine the earning capacity of the 
transmigrant parents, for instance whether they are able to work in the formal 
or informal economy. Additionally, policies will determine if and how much 
parents are able to send to their families at home through remittances.9 The 
authors note that policies in the sending countries are just beginning to focus 
on multi-location families, by re-interpreting the role of caregivers and the 
support they may need. For example, changing policies that determine 
parental rights for caregivers of children with transnational parents.10 In the 
receiving countries, more focus is needed on policies supporting parents 
before and after family reunification.11 For example, providing social services 
such as childcare or family therapy for families during the often challenging 
transition of reunification. 
 
Mette Louise Berg studies the Cuban transnational experience using 
ethnographic storytelling, focusing primarily on memories and the 
transnational connections of Cubans living in Spain. In her analysis she writes 
“their stories are about the importance of both homeland and host-society 
contexts in diaspora formation, and of the role of the state in structuring, 
channeling, and defining migration and its effects on the migrants 
themselves.”12 She warns of the oversimplification of Cuban émigrés as either 
economic or political migrants, given the inherent relationship between the 
two during the Cold War. She writes “the separation of economic from 
political motivations for migrating was a cornerstone in Cold War politics, 
and remains important for diasporic Cubans, but in most cases the two are 
linked.”13 
 
Scholars have used these motivations for migrating to identify categories 
of Cuban migrants, each of which engage in various forms of transnational 
practices. Migrants are categorized in terms of when they left the island 
nation, a shift from exiles to immigrants.14 This shift is notable due in large 
part to the changing political climate, from a period when migrants were seen 
as traitors of the revolution, exemplified by the point made in the slogan, 
“patria o muerte,” in which Cubans were expected to consider their 
commitment to the homeland a matter of life or death. This compared to a 
more recent view of migrants as a life line for family support. Brandhorst 
looks at how Cuban families manage the migration of one of its members and 
this effect on the family unit as a whole. Migration can be seen as a way in 
which a migrant may distance themself from the responsibilities of family, or 
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escape playing an unfavorable role within the family. Additionally, migration 
has been seen to greatly alter the power dynamics within the family unit.15  
 
Transnational scholars have called for “an approach to the study of 
transnational families that takes into consideration the importance and power 
of the nation-state.”16 Cuba presents a unique case for the study of 
transnationalism, in that migration has been extremely limited by the state 
since the revolution in 1959, leading to decades of migration that has been 
varied in its driving factors and in its effects on the family. The transnational 
experience is unavoidably intertwined with the political climate in which the 
transmigrant lives, both by the policies of the homeland as well as the policies 
in the settled country. Policy may bolster the transnational ties if the countries 




Immigration and Emigration Policies from the US and 
Cuba, 1959 – 2000 
 
As the Cuban revolution washed over the island nation in 1959, a wave 
of Cuban refugees began to flee to the United States’ southern shores. Prior to 
the revolution, Cubans had a well-founded history of seeking refuge to the 
north. A notable example being the national icon Jose Martí, who in the 1890s 
organized the new Cuban revolutionary party from the United States. 
However, the revolution of 1959 should be seen as a turning point in the 
relationship between the two countries, especially as it relates to Cuban and 
United States’ policies of emigration and immigration, respectively. The 
history of migration between these two nations consists of a web of push and 
pull factors, through significant events, world politics, and direct public 
policy. While these factors play out between nation states, their impacts are 
felt at the individual level amongst and within families, often creating a 
microcosm of global and ideological disputes between kin.  
 
 
The First Wave 
 
The revolution first sparked the mass exodus of upper-class Cubans, most 
of whom sought asylum in the United States. Prior to the revolution, the 
United States played a major role in the Cuban economy. For the small upper-
class of Cuban society who directly benefited from this relationship, the 
revolution was a direct threat to their elite status and quite possibly to their 
lives. In 1960, amidst this revolutionary climate in Cuba and amidst the 
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ideological battle of the Cold War, “President Eisenhower officially 
recognized Cuba as a Communist state, declared Cuban immigrants to be 
political refugees, and established the national Cuban Refugee Program.”17 
Meanwhile, Cuban policy starting in 1959 until 1979, stated that Cubans were 
free to leave but with no possibility of return. Furthermore, all property and 
assets of those who left would be confiscated.18  
 
Approximately 215,000 Cubans emigrated during the first years of the 
revolution between 1959-1962.19 From within Cuba there were strong 
opinions of those who left, and the new government was very involved in 
shaping these opinions. Those who left were called gusanos, or worms. They 
were seen as enemies of the revolution and against what the country had 
fought for. Maintaining ties with family members who fled was not accepted, 
through both stigma and directives from the new government.20  
 
During the formative years of the revolution, the United States policy 
toward Cuba could be described as subversive in nature, with the sole policy 
objective of overthrowing the new Cuban leadership and returning control of 
the country to more friendly economic and political allies of the United States. 
Masud-Piloto writes: 
 
President Eisenhower's decision to allow immigration from Cuba 
was not hastily made. It was carefully studied and motivated by several 
factors: (a) humanitarian concerns, (b) the desire to overthrow the 
revolution with exile forces, (c) the wish to embarrass the Cuban 
government, and (d) the knowledge that many of the exiles could easily 
be assimilated because they had been linked by profession, business, 
education, and culture to the United States.21 
 
Thus, immigration policy was directly involved in the United States plan 
to regain control of the region. This was no more evident than in the training 
of Cuban exiles for the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. Émigrés turned 
invaders during the Bay of Pigs did nothing to help their image amongst those 
Cubans remaining on the island. It was all too easy to link leaving the country 
with treason following the failed operation, setting a tone for decades to come.   
 
 
Operation Peter Pan 
 
Operation Peter Pan, also known as Operation Pedro Pan, is a prime 
example of the direct impact immigration policy had on Cuban families. The 
operation was carried out over 22 months between 1960 and 1962, and 
consisted of special visa waivers being granted to Cuban children up to 16 
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years of age. In the end, approximately 14,000 children were airlifted from 
Cuba to the United States without their parents.22 This operation was 
motivated by the rampant rumors spreading throughout the country during the 
early years of the revolution. Many parents were extremely fearful of the new 
regime and began to believe that they were at risk of losing their parental 
rights, that their children would be indoctrinated into communism either in 
the schools or even by being sent away to the Soviet Union.23 Amidst these 
fears, parents were offered the chance to send their children alone to the 
United States, in the name of “safeguarding their minds from Castro’s 
revolutionary ideology.”24  
 
The Catholic Church played an integral role in facilitating the operation 
by acting as the supportive resettlement organization.25 Furthermore, it is now 
believed that the United States Central Intelligence Agency may have played 
a significant role in the program as well. Some argue that the CIA was 
responsible for fabricating the rumors, facilitating the development of the visa 
waiver system, and partnering with the Catholic Church to resettle the 
children throughout the country.26  
 
Once these children arrived in the United States they were sent to foster 
homes, boarding schools, orphanages, youth camps, and reformatories, 
essentially anywhere that would take them.27 While many children were 
warmly welcomed, tragic stories of abuse have come out in which children 
were left in vulnerable situations with little or no protection.28 About half the 
children were eventually reunited with their families, but these family 
reunions often took months or years.29 Questions remain regarding the design 
of the operation, since the same objective could have been met if the visa 
waivers were granted to families as units, rather than separating children from 
their families in such a traumatic fashion.30  
 
Reflective of the political divide throughout the Cuban community, there 
are mixed opinions of the program. Some say that it was “an overwhelmingly 
positive experience,”31 and a chance for children to be saved from the 
impending dangers brought on by the new regime. Many Pedro Pan children 
are firmly opposed “to any normalization of relations with the Castro regime, 
the regime that was responsible for breaking up their families and forcing 
them from their homeland.”32 Below are examples of interviews with Pedro 
Pan children as well as Cubans involved in the operation, they illustrate the 
sentiments of both trauma and deep appreciation: 
 
“The family separation was the worst trauma of my life.” 33  
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“I’m so happy I was part of Operation Peter Pan. It was one of the best 
operations in the world. All those children we saved have shown us that our 
sacrifices were worth it.”34 
 
“It was a great emotional cost and it was a great cultural cost. Because I 
don’t feel that I identify with the United States as a nation and I don’t feel that 
I identify with the Cuban nation as much as I would like to identify with the 
Cuban nation. So it was like a sword that split all those children.”35  
 
 
A Push and Pull for Mass Exodus 
 
Between 1961 and 1972 a little under half a million Cubans emigrated 
from the island nation.36 This massive migration was catalyzed by policy 
decisions made by both the U.S. and Cuban governments. Official diplomatic 
relations between the nations ceased on January 3, 1961. Coinciding with this 
closing of doors was the official welcome to the United States of all Cubans 
“fleeing from Communist oppression.”37 The US policy offered visas to all 
Cubans with family in the United States already. Castro’s government initially 
complicated matters by requiring flights be paid in dollars, to which the 
Kennedy administration responded with an offer of free airlift out of Cuba.38 
 
The exodus was both a blessing and a curse for the new regime in Cuba. 
Those who initially fled were from the upper-class, these were professionals 
and their departure meant the loss of valuable human capital, not to mention 
the financial wealth they brought with them into exile. However, those who 
left during this period were those most likely opposed to a socialist revolution, 
and thus the new government often argued that the exodus strengthened the 
revolution by getting rid of the opposition.39 Finally, the US embargo on Cuba 
was issued on February 7th, 1962, further draining the island nation of 
resources. 
 
 The exodus drastically slowed following the Cuban Missile Crisis, with 
only 29,962 emigrating between November 1962 and November 1965.40 
However, in a speech on September 28th, 1965 Fidel Castro opened the gates 
and declared that any Cuban with relatives in the United States who wished 
to leave were free to do so. Relatives were welcomed to pick up their family 
members by sea vessel from the Camarioca port. In his speech, Castro blamed 
the US for canceling direct flights between the countries, claiming this was 
against the wishes of the Cuban government. He further explained that the US 
would welcome the Cubans into their country and criticized their policy as 
hypocritical.  
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The U.S.A. uses emigration from Cuba as a political weapon… if before 
the Revolution the United States had permitted free entrance of Cuban citizens 
without restriction, a much larger number would have gone [than] the total of 
all who have left since the Revolution or who will in the future… To what 
other underdeveloped country in this hemisphere has the United States offered 
its citizens an opportunity to immigrate freely? Any other Latin American 
country to which it made such an offer would empty out overnight.41 
 
This announcement presented the United States with a challenge in 
managing a significant influx of refugees. A formal agreement was made in 
response, resulting in the passage of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 
(CCA), which retroactively provided a legal pathway to citizenship for 
Cubans living in the United States as of the January 1, 1959, the year of the 
revolution.42  As part of the agreement, the US government agreed to 
financially support the refugees, at a rate of three to four thousand per month, 
with priority given to those refugees with direct relatives in the United 
States.43  
 
Given that the first wave of refugees came from the upper-class of society, 
the provision in the new policy that gave priority to émigrés with family in 
the U.S. already, meant that the wealthier class would continue to leave the 
island. In the US the flights from Cuba were dubbed “freedom flights,” further 
branding the immigration policy as one rooted in humanitarian efforts in a 
battle against communism. Entire families were now reunited outside of Cuba, 
leaving behind only those who chose to remain, a political decision with 
significant effects on the family. In the end, the Camarioca boatlift and airlift 
ran from December 1965 until April 1973, resulting in the exodus of over 
270,000 refugees.44  
  
 
Changing Perspectives of the Diaspora from Gusano to 
Community 
 
In 1978, Castro held a press conference to announce talks with the “Cuban 
community abroad.”45 President Carter’s election had ushered in a new era of 
détente between the two countries, formally exemplified by both countries 
opening interests sections in Havana and Washington D.C. Despite the 
diplomatic shift, Castro was specifically inviting the diaspora to the table, not 
the United States government. In his announcement, Castro referred to the 
détente as a contributing factor in the decision to hold talks. However, he 
made it clear that after twenty years the Revolution was well established and 
talks would not pose it any risk, calling the Revolution “irreversible.”46 
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Subjects to be covered during the talks included family reunification, political 
prisoners, family visits to Cuba, and exit permits for those who wished to 
emigrate to the United States.47   
 
 This announcement marked a drastic shift in government opinion of the 
Cuban diaspora. After twenty years of casting the diaspora as worms and 
traitors to the Revolution, Castro signaled that reconciliation was important 
and possible. Reaction to this news was mixed, proving that the Cuban 
diaspora was not at all monolithic. Some violently opposed any talks with 
Castro, while others saw this as an encouraging gesture and opportunity. The 
Committee-of-75 was put together as a negotiating body, “made up of 
seventy-five prominent exile figures”48 from countries with large Cuban 
populations including the US, Venezuela, Spain and others. While Castro may 
have changed his rhetoric by considering the exiles as part of the Cuban 
community, some amongst the diaspora picked up the term traitor to describe 
those who decided to sit at the table with Castro. 
 
 Following the talks, a crack in the door permitted Cubans who had left 
twenty years before to return for visits with their family. Approximately 
100,000 Cubans took this opportunity in 1979, showing that for some a trip 
home was enticing enough to withstand the anti-Castro pressure they would 
surely receive before and after their visit.49 Cuban Americans were permitted 
to visit their families for two weeks, and were required to stay in state run 
hotels and use US dollars. By 1982, a total of 150,000 Cuban Americans had 
made the trip.50  
 
In an attempt to control the adverse effects of visits from family abroad, 
the Cuban government passed Section 1 of Article 282 of the Cuban penal 
code. This section “prohibited the exporting of foreign currency, obtaining 
foreign currency balances in excess of needs, the selling, transferring or 
buying of foreign currencies, travelers checks, money orders or other 
instruments denominated in foreign currencies.”51 This would be one of the 
first examples of Cuban policy focused on the control of remittances into the 
country and the possible influences those monies could have on the fabric of 
the socialist revolution. It is worth pointing out that it was considered a 
criminal act to hold “balances in excess of needs,” an example of a socialist 
concept in which the definition of needs was left to the state.   
 
 
The Second Wave 
 
The reconnection of transnational families in the late 70s was later seen 
as a catalyst which spurred a series of events leading to the Mariel Boatlift in 
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1980, in which approximately 120,000 Cubans fled the island from the port at 
Mariel.52 Any progress that was made by the Committee-of-75 came to a 
sudden halt. Mariel meant another loss of human capital for Castro and yet 
another refugee crisis for the US. 
 
 On the first of April 1980, the Peruvian embassy was stormed by six 
asylum seekers. In response Castro announced that anyone who wanted to 
leave could and should by going to the Peruvian embassy as well. This 
announcement from Castro was reminiscent of reactions to civil unrest during 
the era of the Camarioca airlift. And just as in the past, a surprising number 
of Cubans flooded the embassy, numbering close to 10,000. With this event 
came Castro’s shift back to labeling those who sought to leave as “scum, 
criminals, lumpen, parasites, and antisocial elements.”53 On April 20th, Castro 
yet again called for any relatives in the United States to come pick up their 
kin, now from the Mariel harbor. Carter’s response, maintaining the tone of 
his predecessors, welcomed the Cubans fleeing the island. Declaring that the 
United States would “provide an open heart and open arms for the tens of 
thousands of refugees seeking freedom from Communist domination.”54 This 
announcement commenced the Mariel boatlift, with little or no formal policy 
laid out. By May, daily arrivals in Florida averaged 3,000.55  
 
 The Mariel boatlift put the US immigration policy under a spotlight. Not 
only had the Carter administration not formally set out a policy or procedures 
to administer the arrival of an average of 3,000 Cubans per day, but for months 
prior to the boatlift Haitians had been flooding the Florida shores and had been 
denied a safe haven. Calling the Cuban exiles refugees from communism had 
been the party line for two decades, however the Carter administration began 
to question whether those leaving from the Mariel harbor were more economic 
migrants than political exiles.56 Carter risked being called out for his 
contradictory immigration policy, and for placing quite the burden on the state 
of Florida in the process. The Cuban-Haitian entrant classification became the 
seemingly temporary solution to this dilemma. The new classification granted 
both the Cuban and Haitian exiles legal status in the country and financial 
support for resettlement.57  
 
 
A Shift in the Who and the Why 
 
Camarioca and Mariel bare some similarities, for example in both cases 
the U.S. sent welcoming messages to all refugees fleeing from Communism 
in Cuba, and Castro spurred both events on by announcing a virtual opening 
of the gates. However, given the period of time in between each event, much 
had occurred which led to a major difference in who chose to go north. 
Flanagan: Cuban Transnational Families
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Initially, those in exodus fled the revolutionary shift from capitalism to 
communism. Those in the Mariel boatlift on the other hand had come of age 
during the revolution and had lived many years under communism. Sarah 
Blue notes that “Marielito immigrants and their families in Cuba, though 
facing the same divisive pressures as earlier immigrants, had an underlying 
understanding of the political and economic reality of revolutionary Cuban 
society and deep social and psychological roots in that society in spite of any 
ideological differences with it.”58 In addition, early exiles were likely to have 
left either as a family unit or in stages but eventually reunited with their family 
abroad. For these early exiles, family ties to the island were often severed due 
to differing political ideologies and views of the revolution. Furthermore, for 
the family left behind, maintaining contact with family abroad was greatly 
stigmatized, and in some ways could be dangerous. In a much different 
situation, Blue notes that a majority of those who left during the Mariel boatlift 
were men who had left their families behind not because of political 
differences but instead to pursue economic opportunity, and thus they were 
more likely to maintain transnational ties once they departed from Cuba.59  
 
 Blue describes the 80s as a period of “tentative transnationalism”60 due 
in large part to the connections made during the late 70s between families and 
the mass exodus of the Mariel boatlift. While the policies during this decade 
on both sides restricted connection between these transnational families, the 
interest and desire to connect were there. These connections would soon 
become a source of much needed support in the decade to come, with the fall 
of the Soviet Union and the severe economic crisis Cuba found itself in as a 
result.   
 
 
The Special Period and the Balseros 
 
The fall of the Soviet Union left Cuba in an extremely vulnerable state. 
Since the USSR was Cuba’s primary trading partner for decades, the collapse 
resulted in a dramatic crash of the Cuban economy and a loss of 35% of the 
GDP in 3 years between 1990 and 1993.61 The Cuban government labeled the 
early 90s as “The Special Period in Peacetime,” a euphemism for a period 
characterized by severe shortages, especially in food and petroleum. During 
the crisis, Cubans reverted back to old methods of transportation and farming, 
such as using oxen and horse and buggies. This also marked the beginning of 
urban farming, a solution to the extremely limited and insufficient rations 
provided to Cubans during the crisis. In many ways, this period was a perfect 
example of the Cuban society resolviendo, which translated means 
“resolving.” This is a characteristic deeply rooted in Cuban society, that when 
faced with an obstacle one will simply resuelve, or find an alternative solution.  
Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 2
2018                   THE HATFIELD GRADUATE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS                 13 
 
 For many this alternative solution was to leave the island or to send word 
to family abroad that their support was greatly needed. Thus, this era was 
further characterized by two related phenomena, first a flood of millions of 
dollars coming into the country under the table from émigrés, creating a black 
market in the city of Havana.62 And second, the third mass exodus from the 
island since the revolution, this time in massive numbers of makeshift boats 
constructed from tires as well as the building materials from people’s homes.63 
Those fleeing earned the name balseros, or rafters.  
 
Reaction to the balseros was mixed, similar to past mass migrations. In a 
documentary covering this period, images show scenes of protests in the 
streets where crowds chanted “traitor” and “leave.”64 These scenes are 
followed by scenes of massive crowds of people cheering in a procession 
following newly crafted rafts through the streets of Havana on their way to 
the Malecón; once at the water’s edge, families wade into the sea, crying and 
singing songs, blessing those embarking on the life threatening journey north.  
 
For many, taking to the sea was the only option, and an extremely risky 
one. As one balsero reflected “I didn’t have and do not have any problems 
with the Castro regime or the Revolution. I fought for the Revolution…Cuba 
was very, very poor… My choices were to leave with my children or starve.”65  
 
The Special Period required policy responses by both the US and the 
Cuban governments. First, in reaction to the flood of dollars coming into the 
country, the Cuban government decided to legalize US dollars by creating a 
second currency specifically for foreigners. This policy opened the door for 
even more remittances, which soon became an important source of income for 
many Cuban families, and as an unintended consequence a source of disparity 
as well.66 In addition to legalizing the dollar, the Cuban government permitted 
the opening of foreign currency only stores. Certain commodities were only 
available at these stores, and thus only those Cubans with access to 
remittances could benefit. Therefore, families on the same block may be in 
vastly different situations economically, depending on their connections 
abroad. Furthermore, to complicate matters Cubans were actually not 
permitted to use the foreign currency themselves. The currency was legalized 
but only for foreigners to use, which included visiting Cuban émigrés. Thus, 
Cuban émigrés visiting would be put into a role of authority within the family 
by being singled out as the provider. In some cases, these remittances would 
create conflict around the concept of consumer goods and the ideals of the 
revolution, and a lack of understanding between family members.67  
 
 The second problem that faced both nations was yet another exodus of 
refugees. While remittances flooded into Cuba, significant numbers of Cubans 
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took to the seas in makeshift rafts, leading many to think the early 90s would 
be a repeat of the Mariel boatlift from just a decade before. It was during this 
time that Cuba found itself dealing with mass protests, unrest, asylum seekers 
flooding various embassies in Havana, and a series of violent hijackings of 
tugboats and ferries attempting to escape to the north.68 Between 1990 and 
1994, some 13,600 Cubans left the island and arrived in the United States.69 
The Cuban government made attempts to prevent this exodus, by interdicting 
the vessels and detaining the would-be émigrés to the island.  
 
By 1994, the exodus had gotten out of control and amidst this crisis Castro 
and Clinton volleyed countering policies back and forth across the Florida 
strait. On August 5th, Castro announced he would no longer stop anyone 
wishing to leave the island, a message reminiscent of earlier episodes of mass 
exodus. Castro once again was angered by US immigration policy, blaming it 
for incentivizing Cubans to take to the dangerous waters. The month of 
August became known as the Balsero crisis, with 30,900 Cubans on rafts 
interdicted at sea starting August 13th.70 By August 19th, President Clinton 
fired back at Castro and declared that Castro would not be permitted to dictate 
US immigration policy again as he had in the past. Clinton announced: 
 
In recent weeks, the Castro regime has encouraged Cubans to take 
to the sea in unsafe vessels to escape their nation’s internal problems… 
let me be clear: The Cuban Government will not succeed in any attempt 
to dictate the American immigration policy… 
Today I have ordered that illegal refugees from Cuba will not be 
allowed to enter the United States. Refugees rescued at sea will be taken 
to our naval base at Guantánamo while we explore the possibility of other 
safe havens within the region…The United States will detain, investigate 
and, if necessary, prosecute Americans who take to the sea to pick up 
Cubans. Vessels used in such activities will be seized. 71 
  
 Along with Clinton’s policy to stop the rafters on their way to US shores 
and bring them to Guantánamo, the president reduced the amount of 
remittances Cuban Americans could send to their families, as well as a number 
of other policies strengthening the embargo. And between 1996 and 1998, the 
US completely prohibited the sending of remittances all together.72 By 1995, 
the two governments came to an agreement, establishing what would be called 
the “wet foot, dry foot” policy. Under this new regime, “unless citing fears of 
persecution, Cubans intercepted at sea would be returned to Cuba, where the 
government agreed not to retaliate against them.”73 For all those who did 
claim persecution, the US government would provide resettlement support 
and a pathway to citizenship. And finally, there would be an annual minimum 
of 20,000 Cubans allowed into the United States.74  
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 Amidst the policy battle between Castro and Clinton, the 1990s became 
the decade of family reconnection, not only in terms of remittances but also 
in the sheer number of Cuban Americans returning to the island to visit family. 
In 1993, less than 10,000 Cuban Americans visited, by 1996 it was 60,000 
and then by 2001 it was over 100,000.75 Blue writes that the Special Period 
was one in which migration was depoliticized, and both outmigration and 
remittances were seen “as a practical solution to household scarcity.”76 For 
many Cuban Americans this was an opportunity to reconnect with family. 
Studies found that, despite their previous political divides, older generations 
of émigrés reached out to family on the island to provide support.77 
Surprisingly émigrés who had left before 1980 were more likely to visit than 
those who left after 1980.78 However, this difference may have been due to 
the difference in socioeconomic status between those who had arrived more 
recently and those who had been established in the US for decades.  
 
 
Differences between the First and Second Wave 
 
Susan Eckstein and Lorena Barberia find in their study of Cuban émigrés 
that there was a distinct difference between those who emigrated before 1980 
and those who emigrated after.79 They label these two cohorts as first wavers 
and second wavers, and they found that each cohort differed in socioeconomic 
status as well as in the “opportunity structure they faced when arriving in the 
States.”80 Those in the first wave were received by more welcoming policy in 
the US, while those who left after 1980 experienced more resistance. In both 
cases the US policy did act as a pull factor, in that those who chose to emigrate 
understood there would be certain benefits waiting for them. In some cases, 
this understanding was not from the US policy alone, but also from friends 
and family who had already settled in the United States.  
 
Another major difference between the groups was the push factors. The 
first wavers were generally pushed from the island due to political shifts, 
while a majority of the second wavers were pushed in large part by the dire 
economic situation on the island.81 For those in the second wave, exogenous 
events such as the fall of the Soviet Union, in conjunction with the continued 
US blockade meant a choice of staying to starve or fleeing to survive. 
However, a similar life or death decision faced those who left in the first wave 
during the Revolution, given that any connection with the fallen Batista 
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Discussion: Modern Day Challenges 
 
 While visiting Cuba for two weeks, several themes repeated themselves 
related to migration and its effects on Cuba. What follows is a short discussion 
of those themes which are: the role remittances play in the Cuban economy 
today and their effects, the concept of circular migration, and the current shift 
in US/Cuban relations.  
 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the onset of the Special Period, 
remittances have increased substantially. According to a presentation by Dr. 
José Luis Rodríguez García, the former Minister of Economy and Planning of 
Cuba, starting in 1989, remittances were calculated at 537 million USD, by 
2010 they were 1.180 billion USD and by 2016 they were 2.5 to 3 billion 
USD.82 Additionally, remittances from 2016 were split 50/50 between 
consumption and investment.83 Thus, remittances have continued to play a 
significant role in Cuban families’ economic well-being. Dr. Rodriguez 
explained during his presentation how the Cuban government historically has 
attempted to capitalize on the flow of remittances by essentially adding a tax 
on those items that are only available for purchase using foreign currency. 
According to Enrique Cabezas, PhD, these remittances benefit the country as 
a whole and there is no way of avoiding the flow.84 However, Dr. Rodriguez 
said that it is important for the government to figure out a good way to use the 
money.85  
 
While taking a tour of Havana, one will see the striking juxtaposition of 
crumbling homes next-door to beautiful and newly renovated homes. Miguel 
Coyula, a prominent architect from Havana calls this phenomena ruins to 
remittances.86 According to Mr. Coyula, Havana is the largest recipient of 
remittances as well as a major benefactor of the tourism industry, with 51% 
of the income coming from tourism.87 With this in mind, 96% of the stock of 
homes in Havana are privately owned, however with an average monthly 
salary of $27, routine upkeep of aging homes is nearly impossible. As a result, 
much of the remittances coming in go towards renovation of homes. Those 
lucky enough to have connections abroad are able to benefit from the 
burgeoning tourism sector, renting out rooms in their renovated homes to 
tourists looking for a more authentic experience. Coinciding with this stream 
of funding from remittances is the slow change towards self-employment, a 
major shift in the Cuban economy and society as a whole. Self-employment 
and increased opportunities to profit from the tourism industry could result in 
severe income inequality.  
 
 The Cuban government today faces a challenging transition, away from 
a command and control based economy and toward one focused more on 
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competition and capitalist principles. This transition is challenging because 
many of the socialist ideals are still deeply rooted in what it means to be Cuban 
and because many of the socialist policies that remain in place clash with 
policies based on opening up the economy. For example, remittances and 
tourism have the potential to lead to increases in income inequality, which 
contradicts the socialist principles the Revolution was built on. Additionally, 
due to a temporary housing policy from the Revolution, these socialist policies 
may eventually lead to urban sprawl and the gentrification of Havana. As part 
of the Revolution, the Castro regime outlawed homelessness, declaring that 
all people must have a house even if temporarily. This policy led to the 
construction of temporary housing. Today, temporary housing is constructed 
on the outskirts of Havana with little planning. The construction is meant to 
be temporary and thus those who live in these new neighborhoods experience 
limited access to utilities. With the influx of remittances going towards 
renovations, those families who do not have access to foreign funds find 
themselves in temporary housing in the outskirts when their homes crumble.88 
Providing a home for those who have lost theirs is in many ways a laudable 
government policy. However, it is a serious problem when there are 17,000 
people currently living in temporary housing, and 140,000 people on the 
waitlist.89 According to Mr. Coyula, an average of 3 buildings collapse per 
day in Havana, making this a real concern, not just a hypothetical one. 
 
  The process of circular migration is a theme which was repeated in three 
different contexts while visiting Cuba. Circular migration is when émigrés 
return to their home country, deciding not to permanently settle abroad. The 
three different individuals who mentioned this theme were: an American 
expatriate living in the country for five years, a nephew speaking of his uncle 
who had spent three decades in Germany, and an employee in a state-run 
business. Collectively these three spoke of the challenges faced by Cuban 
émigrés abroad, in a rapidly moving globalized society based on capitalism. 
Some mentioned the idea that Cubans were simply not prepared by their 
upbringing to compete and that life abroad was more difficult because of this 
deeply ingrained characteristic; a trait which was informed and enforced 
throughout their life in a socialist society. In one case, even after years abroad, 
the idea of returning home was by far more attractive than staying in a 
developed nation. The émigré returned to their simpler life on the island, with 
their families. In a contrasting case, a Cuban national expressed sheer lack of 
understanding why a sibling would leave her nice home and good job in 
Havana for a stressful job abroad. In this case there was almost no hope for a 
return, back to the family and to what this individual believed was a great life 
in Havana.  
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This theme of an unrealistic perception of life abroad was also heard from 
Cuban clients at an office of refugee resettlement in the United States where 
the researcher worked in past years. Balancing family ties with challenges 
faced by an aggressive capitalist culture plagued those who had worked hard 
to make the journey north. While these stories represent a small fraction of 
the overall Cuban experience abroad, the theme’s repetition is worth noting.  
 
  A final note on the recent shift in relations between the US and Cuban 
governments. The Cuban people responded with joy to President Obama’s 
announcement of a warming relationship between the two countries. The 
researcher heard stories of lines around the block coming out of the US 
embassy, plans to take opportunities abroad to visit, and more. Since the 
election of Donald Trump there has been a notable chilling effect, with a shift 
back to a more familiar situation characterized by uncertainty and distrust. 
 
Since the Trump Administration greatly reduced the number of staff at 
the embassy, there is no longer a line out the door waiting to apply for a visa. 
Instead, if a Cuban wishes to apply for a visa they can spend approximately 
$400 dollars, fly to a city in Latin America with a US embassy and apply for 
one. However, as was explained by one Cuban, why would you spend all that 
money without the guarantee of getting the Visa? You could end up having 
your application rejected and be out the cost of the flight, a hard cost to bear. 
One individual remarked that there was no outcry in response to the shift back 
to restricted policies, instead there was a sense of familiarity and acceptance 
that one must simply continue to wait.  For many years, the Cuban people 
have shown that they are very capable of resolviendo any barriers both 
artificial and real, put up between the US and Cuba. And sometimes resolver 
means to wait, or to go through another country, or to buy an internet card off 





 The research presented here focused on the following questions: what 
role did policies play in creating transnational families? How has the 
perception of these families change over time? And what role do policy 
professionals play in developing policy that will affect transnational families. 
By taking the historical perspective, the research showed that both the US and 
Cuban policies acted as push and pull factors in fueling the Cuban migration. 
These policies furthermore had the often negative effect of creating fissions 
within and amongst families along political ideologies. For those families not 
separated by political differences, the move north was often dangerous, and 
was not so much a choice as a necessity to survive. Policy has played a large 
Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 2
2018                   THE HATFIELD GRADUATE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS                 19 
 
role in making emigration a necessity. Policy has also played a large role in 
framing the perception of those who do decide to emigrate. Both governments 
painted their own image of the émigrés, either as refugees on freedom flights 
or as worms, parasites, and threats to the Revolution.  
 
  Finally, it is important as policymakers that we consider the global 
effects of our policies. In the matters discussed above, the US clearly used its 
immigration policy at times as a tool in waging a geopolitical battle. Castro 
also frequently used Cuban emigration policies to strengthen his Revolution 
and to shame his adversary. I would argue that the relationship between these 
two countries is extremely complicated and neither side is ever completely 
innocent nor is either completely to blame. I would, however, argue that the 
policies and the methods in which these policies were used had the direct 
effect of creating transnational families and thus putting hardship on both 
nations’ citizens.  
  
1 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “Trends in 
International Migrant Stock: The 2017 Revision,” United Nations Database, 
POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2017 (United Nations, 2017), 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.shtml. 
2 Linda Basch, Nations Unbound : Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and 
Deterritorialized Nation-States (S.I. : Gordon and Breach, 1994), 7. 
3 Basch, Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized 
Nation-States. 
4 For example, see the 1998 California Prop 227 “English Language in the Public Schools Statute.” 
This initiative took away foreign language instruction, requiring that all instruction be in English. 
The argument being that full immersion would improve children’s advancement in society. 
Alejandro Portes, “Chapter 10: Conclusion Mainstream Ideologies and the Long-Term Prospects of 
Immigrant Communities,” in Legacies : The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation (Berkeley : 
New York: Berkeley : University of California Press ; New York : Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 
271, https://quod-lib-umich-
edu.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/cache/h/e/b/heb31535.0001.001/00000317.tif.18.pdf#page=7;zoom=75. 
5 Kristine M. Zentgraf and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, “Transnational Family Separation: A Framework 
for Analysis,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38, no. 2 (February 1, 2012): 358, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.646431. 






Flanagan: Cuban Transnational Families




10 Ibid.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Mette Louise Berg, “Cubans in Spain: Transnational Connections and Memories,” in Cuba in a 
Global Context : International Relations, Internationalism, and Transnationalism, by Catherine 
Krull (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2014), 264. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Eckstein, S., “Cubans without Borders: From the Buildup to the Breakdown of a Socially 
Constructed Wall across the Florida Straits,” in Cuba in a Global Context : International Relations, 
Internationalism, and Transnationalism, by Catherine Krull (Gainesville, FL: University Press of 
Florida, 2014), 293. 
15 Rosa María Brandhorst, “Transnational Families in Cuba and Germany: On the Intersection between 
Isolation, Restrictions, and Agency,” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / 
Revue Canadienne Des Études Latino-Américaines et Caraïbes 38, no. 2 (July 3, 2013): 260, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08263663.2014.959401. 
16 Ibid., 271. 
17 Sarah A. Blue, “From Exiles to Transnationals? Changing State Policy and the Emergence of Cuban 
Transnationalism,” in Cuba Transnational, ed. Damián J Fernández (Gainesville: Gainesville : 
University Press of Florida, 2005), 26. 
18 Lorena Barberia, “Remittances to Cuba: An Evaluation of Cuban and US Government Policy 
Measures,” Working Paper (Inter-University Committee on International Migration, September 
2002), 5, http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/97606. 
19 Alberto J. Perez, “Wet Foot, Dry Foot, No Foot: The Recurring Controversy between Cubans, 
Haitians, and the United States Immigration Policy,” Nova Law Review 28, no. 2 (2004): 441. 
20 Barberia, “Remittances to Cuba,” 6. 
21 Felix Roberto Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants : Cuban Migration to the 
U.S., 1959-1995 (Lanham, Md.: Lanham, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), 33. 
22 Estela Bravo, Operation Peter Pan: Flying Back to Cuba (Bravo Films, 2011). 
23 Ibid. 
24 Flora M. González Mandri, “Operation Pedro Pan: A Tale of Trauma and Remembrance,” Latino 
Studies 6, no. 3 (September 1, 2008): 252, https://doi.org/10.1057/lst.2008.24. 





Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 2
2018                   THE HATFIELD GRADUATE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS                 21 
 
 
29 “Children Of Cuba Remember Their Flight To America,” Weekend Edition Saturday (National 
Public Radio, November 19, 2011), https://www.npr.org/2011/11/19/142534943/pedro-pan-
childrens-life-altering-flight-from-cuba. 
30 Bravo, Operation Peter Pan: Flying Back to Cuba. 
31 “Children Of Cuba Remember Their Flight To America.” 
32 Ibid. 
33 Bravo, Operation Peter Pan: Flying Back to Cuba. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants : Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959-
1995, 59. 
37 Ibid., 35. 




41 Ibid., 59. 
42 Perez, “Wet Foot, Dry Foot, No Foot: The Recurring Controversy between Cubans, Haitians, and the 
United States Immigration Policy,” 441. 
43 Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants : Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959-
1995, 61. 
44 Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants : Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959-
1995. 
45 Ibid., 75. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants : Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959-
1995. 
48 Ibid., 76. 
49 Blue, “From Exiles to Transnationals? Changing State Policy and the Emergence of Cuban 
Transnationalism,” 27. 
50 Barberia, “Remittances to Cuba,” 7. 
51 Ibid., 8. 
52 Blue, “From Exiles to Transnationals? Changing State Policy and the Emergence of Cuban 
Transnationalism,” 27. 
 
Flanagan: Cuban Transnational Families
22                                          CUBAN TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES                         Vol. 3:1 
 
 
53 Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants : Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959-
1995, 79. 
54 Ibid., 83. 




58 Blue, “From Exiles to Transnationals? Changing State Policy and the Emergence of Cuban 
Transnationalism,” 27. 
59 Blue, “From Exiles to Transnationals? Changing State Policy and the Emergence of Cuban 
Transnationalism.” 
60 Ibid., 27. 
61 Dr. Jose Luis Rodríguez, “General Overview of the Cuban Economy” (Centro de Estudios Martianos 
(CEM), Havana, Cuba, December 2017). 
62 Miguel Coyula, “Architect, Urban Development Specialist, and Community Planner” (Havana, Cuba, 
December 2017). 
63 Carles Bosch and Josep Maria Domènech, Cuban Rafters, Documentary, 2002, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0321376/. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Susan Eckstein and Lorena Barberia, “Grounding Immigrant Generations in History: Cuban 
Americans and Their Transnational Ties1,” International Migration Review 36, no. 3 (September 1, 
2002): 807, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2002.tb00105.x. 
66 Coyula, “Architect, Urban Development Specialist, and Community Planner.” 
67 Barberia, “Remittances to Cuba,” 9. 
68 Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants : Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959-
1995, 137; Maria E. Sartori, “The Cuban Migration Dilemma: An Examination of the United States’ 
Policy of Temporary Protection in Offshore Safe Havens,” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 
15, no. 2 (2001): 319–55. 
69 Joge Duany, “Cuban Migration: A Postrevolution Exodus Ebbs and Flows,” Profile, 
migrationpolicy.org, July 6, 2017, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/cuban-migration-
postrevolution-exodus-ebbs-and-flows. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Sartori, “The Cuban Migration Dilemma: An Examination of the United States’ Policy of Temporary 
Protection in Offshore Safe Havens,” 328–29. 
72 Blue, “From Exiles to Transnationals? Changing State Policy and the Emergence of Cuban 
Transnationalism,” 30. 
 
Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 2
2018                   THE HATFIELD GRADUATE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS                 23 
 
 
73 Jeanne Batalova and Jie Zong, “Cuban Immigrants in the United States,” Spotlight, 
migrationpolicy.org, November 9, 2017, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/cuban-immigrants-
united-states. 
74 Sartori, “The Cuban Migration Dilemma: An Examination of the United States’ Policy of Temporary 
Protection in Offshore Safe Havens,” 330. 
75 Eckstein and Barberia, “Grounding Immigrant Generations in History,” 814. 
76 Blue, “From Exiles to Transnationals? Changing State Policy and the Emergence of Cuban 
Transnationalism,” 29. 
77 Blue, “From Exiles to Transnationals? Changing State Policy and the Emergence of Cuban 
Transnationalism.” 
78 Eckstein and Barberia, “Grounding Immigrant Generations in History,” 814. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., 801. 
81 Ibid., 802. 
82 Rodríguez, “General Overview of the Cuban Economy.” 
83 Ibid. 
84 Enrique J. Gómez Cabezas, In-Person, December 20, 2017. 
85 Rodríguez, “General Overview of the Cuban Economy.” 






Barberia, Lorena. “Remittances to Cuba: An Evaluation of Cuban and US Government Policy 
Measures.” Working Paper. Inter-University Committee on International Migration, September 
2002. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/97606. 
 
Basch, Linda. Nations Unbound : Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and 
Deterritorialized Nation-States. S.I.: Gordon and Breach, 1994. 
 
Batalova, Jeanne, and Jie Zong. “Cuban Immigrants in the United States.” Spotlight. 
migrationpolicy.org, November 9, 2017. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/cuban-immigrants-
united-states. 
 
Flanagan: Cuban Transnational Families
24                                          CUBAN TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES                         Vol. 3:1 
 
 
Berg, Mette Louise. “Cubans in Spain: Transnational Connections and Memories.” In Cuba in a Global 
Context : International Relations, Internationalism, and Transnationalism, by Catherine Krull, 257–
70. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2014. 
Blue, Sarah A. “From Exiles to Transnationals? Changing State Policy and the Emergence of Cuban 
Transnationalism.” In Cuba Transnational, edited by Damián J Fernández, 24–41. Gainesville. FL: 
University Press of Florida, 2005. 
Bosch, Carles, and Josep Maria Domènech. Cuban Rafters. Documentary, 2002. 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0321376/. 
Brandhorst, Rosa María. “Transnational Families in Cuba and Germany: On the Intersection between 
Isolation, Restrictions, and Agency.” Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies / 
Revue Canadienne Des Études Latino-Américaines et Caraïbes 38, no. 2 (July 3, 2013): 254–78. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08263663.2014.959401. 
Bravo, Estela. Operation Peter Pan: Flying Back to Cuba. Bravo Films, 2011. 
Cabezas, Enrique J. Gómez. In-Person, December 20, 2017. 
“Children Of Cuba Remember Their Flight To America.” Weekend Edition Saturday. National Public 
Radio, November 19, 2011. https://www.npr.org/2011/11/19/142534943/pedro-pan-childrens-life-
altering-flight-from-cuba. 
Coyula, Miguel. “Architect, Urban Development Specialist, and Community Planner.” Havana, Cuba, 
December 2017. 
Duany, Joge. “Cuban Migration: A Postrevolution Exodus Ebbs and Flows.” Profile. 
migrationpolicy.org, July 6, 2017. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/cuban-migration-
postrevolution-exodus-ebbs-and-flows. 
Eckstein, Susan. “Cubans without Borders: From the Buildup to the Breakdown of a Socially 
Constructed Wall across the Florida Straits.” In Cuba in a Global Context : International Relations, 
Internationalism, and Transnationalism, by Catherine Krull, 287–301. Gainesville, FL: University 
Press of Florida, 2014. 
Eckstein, Susan, and Lorena Barberia. “Grounding Immigrant Generations in History: Cuban 
Americans and Their Transnational Ties1.” International Migration Review 36, no. 3 (September 1, 
2002): 799–837. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2002.tb00105.x. 
Mandri, Flora M. González. “Operation Pedro Pan: A Tale of Trauma and Remembrance.” Latino 
Studies 6, no. 3 (September 1, 2008): 252–68. https://doi.org/10.1057/lst.2008.24. 
Masud-Piloto, Felix Roberto. From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants : Cuban Migration to the 
U.S., 1959-1995. Lanham, Md.: Lanham, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield, 1996. 
Perez, Alberto J. “Wet Foot, Dry Foot, No Foot: The Recurring Controversy between Cubans, Haitians, 
and the United States Immigration Policy.” Nova Law Review 28, no. 2 (2004): 437–65. 
Portes, Alejandro. “Chapter 10: Conclusion Mainstream Ideologies and the Long-Term Prospects of 
Immigrant Communities.” In Legacies : The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation, 269–86. 




Hatfield Graduate Journal of Public Affairs, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 2
2018                   THE HATFIELD GRADUATE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS                 25 
 
 
Rodríguez, Jose Luis. “General Overview of the Cuban Economy.” Centro de Estudios Martianos 
(CEM), Havana, Cuba, December 2017. 
Sartori, Maria E. “The Cuban Migration Dilemma: An Examination of the United States’ Policy of 
Temporary Protection in Offshore Safe Havens.” Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 15, no. 2 
(2001): 319–55. 
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. “Trends in 
International Migrant Stock: The 2017 Revision.” United Nations Database, 
POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2017. United Nations, 2017. 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.shtml. 
Zentgraf, Kristine M., and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla. “Transnational Family Separation: A Framework 
for Analysis.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38, no. 2 (February 1, 2012): 345–66. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.646431. 
 
Flanagan: Cuban Transnational Families
